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Is State Power to Protect Health Compatible
With Substantive Due Process Rights?
Allan J Jacobs, MD., JD.'
INTRODUCTION

Government action to further public health goals sometimes must be both
rapid and drastic to be successful. Epidemics of disease can not only kill
many people quickly, but can also have a ruinous impact on a society. For
example, epidemics of communicable diseases have dealt serious blows,
causing demographic and economic devastation to entire civilizations.'
Injuries or exposure to toxic substances also can seriously damage the
health of many people.2
The Supreme Court has asserted that the term "public health" means
"[t]he health of the community." It rejected the use of the of an alternative
definition: "[t]he ways and means of conserving the health of the members
of a community, as by preventive medicine, organized care of the sick,
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1.

See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 195

(1997) (describing the disastrous effect on North American populations of epidemics
introduced by Europeans); see also, generally, WILLIAM ROSEN, JUSTINIAN'S FLEA: PLAGUE,
EMPIRE, AND THE BIRTH OF EUROPE (2007) (describing the plague epidemics in the Byzantine

and Parthian Empires during the 6th Century and the depopulation and economic devastation
to these civilizations as a result. Rosen speculates that these plaque epidemics aborted the
hitherto successful attempts of Byzantium to conquer the former Western Roman Empire.
Rosen further speculates that the weakness of Byzantium and Parthia resulting from these
epidemics may have been a necessary factor in the spread of Islam out of the Arabian
Peninsula in the 7th Century.).
2. See, e.g., Margaret D. Sanborn et. al., Identifying and Managing Adverse
Environmental Health Effects: 3. Lead Exposure, 166 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1287, 1287-89
(2002) ("[L]ead persists in lead paint, old plumbing and contaminated soil."). In Ontario,
over five percent of children living in urban areas have elevated blood lead levels. Id. at
1288. The effects of lead poisoning include anemia, kidney disease, and brain injury. Id. at
1288-89.
3. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (quoting WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)).
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etc.," 4 (emphasis added). This second definition is more rational, since it is
people, not communities, who acquire disease and injury. Regardless, a
public health law can be defined as a systematic governmental measure
meant to prevent or ameliorate disease or injury.
Public health statutes, ordinances and regulations may interfere with
personal liberties by restricting or imposing behavior or treatment. For
example, states can quarantine people with infectious disease,' inject
vaccines into the bodies of healthy persons, 6 and force patients with
diseases to take medication. Sick people are forbidden to procure and use
certain substances they believe would help them but which the government
deems ineffective or harmful. Restrictions on smoking in public places9
have been implemented to counter the known dangers of smoking.' 0
Fluorides are added to drinking water" to prevent dental caries.' 2
Public health laws can pose difficult problems in adjudication. Prompt
and extensive government action may be needed to prevent large-scale
death or injury, however, the issues involved may be highly technical and
4. Id. at 465-66 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)).
5. See generally Michelle A. Daubert, Comment: Pandemic Fears and Contemporary
Quarantine:Protecting Liberty Through a Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFFALO
L. REv. 1299 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (upholding a city ordinance requiring
children attending public schools to be vaccinated); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (upholding the power of a state to grant the board of health the ability to require and
enforce vaccination of inhabitants).
7. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding the State has an
interest in ensuring the safety of both prison staff and prisoners by providing a prisoner with
medical treatment for his illness).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (holding no terminally ill
exception exists to the denial of access to a drug not approved under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001)
(finding no medical necessity exception existed to the prohibition under the Controlled
Substances Act on manufacture and distribution of a drug); and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005) (holding that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may criminalize intrastate
manufacture, distribution, or possession of a substance even where states approve its use for
medicinal purposes).
9. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(a)-(b) (West 2007) ("Smoking is prohibited in all
enclosed spaces of places of employment. .. 'Enclosed space' includes lobbies, lounges,
waiting areas, elevators, stairwells, and restrooms that are a structural part of the building.").
10. See generally Smoking and Tobacco Use: Health Effects, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic-information/healtheffects/

(last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
11. See Ruth Roemer, Water Fluoridation: Public Health Responsibility and the
DemocraticProcess, 55 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1337, 1337 (1965); see also Douglas A. Balog,
Fluoridation of Public Water Systems: Valid Exercise of State Police Power or
Constitutional Violation, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 645, 645 (1997) (for a more recent
discussion).
12. See Roemer, supranote 11, at 1337; Balog, supra note 11, at 646.
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difficult for non-scientists, including lawyers and judges, to understand.
These issues may require comprehension of complex biological processes
or understanding of mathematically sophisticated statistical inferences.13
Judges may have to make decisions based on scientific data that they do not
thoroughly understand, leading to far-reaching decisions with significant
impact on individual liberty.
Finally, inaction motivated by respect for individual rights may result in
externalities causing grave harm to third parties. For example, if a Typhoid
Mary is not barred from her career in food preparation, then the bacteria she
carries have the potential to cause illness or death to the numerous patrons
at restaurants, diners, cafeterias, etc.14 Thus, courts are asked to resolve
conflicts involving either complex technical issues, measures which may be
adopted or imposed in haste, or both simultaneously. They may have to
choose between averting grave threats to the population and crimping
important liberties.
The United States Supreme Court has, in some cases, upheld state claims
of police power in the service of public health against individual claims of
due process rights.' 5 In other cases, however, the Court has upheld
individual rights against state police power.' 6 Some writers claim that these
two lines of cases are incompatible.17 This article will illustrate that the
tension between individual rights and use of state police power in these
Supreme Court cases can be rationally reconciled. It will frame a doctrinal
approach involving two concepts, each of which is compatible with
13. See, e.g., Indust. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 61112, 631 (1980) (This case fills 117 pages of United States Reports and decided which of two
seemingly incompatible mandates in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was
applicable to concentrations of benzene in the air. It chose to require OSHA to set a standard
that "most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity,"
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2006), rather than allowing a standard that merely required
regulations that assured conditions "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2006). The statute
required OSHA to base standards on "research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other
information as may be appropriate," and to consider "the latest available scientific data in the
field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and
safety laws." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). The opinion notes that "the written explanation of the
standard fills 184 pages of the printed appendix." Indust. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 631.).
14. Janet Brooks, The Sad and Tragic Life of Typhoid Mary, 154 CAN. MED. Ass'N J.
915, 915-16 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Compagnie Francaise v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177
(1922).
16. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
17. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines,86 TEX. L. REv. 277, 279-80 (2007).
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Supreme Court public health jurisprudence, if not implicit in it.
This article will first demonstrate that courts have used a unique standard
of scrutiny in public health cases. Constraints imposed by dicta in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts'8 can be generalized to articulate a common
standard, termed here, "enhanced public health scrutiny." This standard is
less stringent than strict scrutiny in that it does not require adoption of the
narrowest possible remedy. Second, it will characterize the beneficiaries of
public health laws as those persons who would actually suffer injurious
consequences from the government's failure to act. The identity of these
individuals, however, often cannot be determined in advance. Individuals
who would sustain a specific illness or injury, but who are unidentifiable
prior to such an event and whose harm would have been ameliorated by a
public health law, termed here as "inchoate class." This article will show
that the Court has upheld public health laws that protect such inchoate
classes. Conversely, decisions that favor individual liberty over police
power do so in the absence of an inchoate class. Importantly, the doctrines
described do not impact the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy. 9
Part I will summarize the constitutional basis for public health laws. Part
II will discuss a recent decision,20 which was subsequently reversed, 2' that
ruled on a due process challenge to drug approvals provisions of the Food
Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).22 This discussion will illuminate the
issues involved in the conflict between government interests and individual
liberties in this area, and will serve as a useful starting point for an
elaboration of my thesis. Part III will argue that the Supreme Court has
implicitly established enhanced public health scrutiny as a standard for
judging the constitutionality of public health legislation that restricts
individual liberty. Part IV will elaborate on the doctrine of inchoate
classes, and will conclude that the protection of inchoate classes constitutes
a compelling government interest. Part V will synthesize the doctrines
elaborated in Parts III and IV, and will show that they generate a coherent

18. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
19. I use the term "termination of pregnancy" in preference to "abortion" throughout
(except in quotations) because the medical meaning of "abortion" is loss of pregnancy for
any reason prior to viability. See, F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 215
(23rd ed. 2010) ("[Albortion is premature birth before a live birth is possible, and in this
sense is synonymous with miscarriage. It also means an induced pregnancy termination to
destroy the fetus."). The definition of "abortion" is stable. See JACK A. PRITCHARD & PAUL
C. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 483 (15th ed. 1976).
20. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail 1) v. Von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
21. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail 2) v. Von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
22. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
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basis for analyzing challenges to public health laws. This analytical
framework is compatible with existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LEGISLATION

The Commerce Clause 23 is frequently invoked to provide the authority
for Congress to enact statutes and regulations benefiting public health, such
as the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) 24 and the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA). 25 The Supreme Court has rejected due process
challenges against these statutes without addressing the constitutional issues
presented by lower courts. In United States v. Rutherford,2 6 the Supreme
Court upheld the FDCA drug approval process.27 It declined to enjoin the
federal government from "interfering with the interstate shipment and sale
of Laetrile 2 8 [for the purpose of treating cancer], a drug not approved for
distribution under the [FDCA]." 2 9 A lower court had enjoined the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) from interfering with interstate shipment and
sale of commerce in Laetrile on the ground, inter alia, that such restriction
violated the privacy rights of terminally ill cancer patients. 3 0 The
unanimous reversal did not reach constitutional issues.31
The Court also rejected a challenge to the CSA in United States v.
Oakland CannabisBuyers' Cooperative.32 The Court held that a decision

23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction
into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant
to subsection (b) or (j) is effective with respect to such drug." (emphasis added)).
25. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006) ("A major portion of the traffic
in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the
traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture,
local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon
interstatecommerce. . ." (emphasis added)).
26. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
27. Id. at 558. The challenges to federal law discussed in this section are based on the
5th Amendment Due Process Clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
28 Latril is an extract of apricot pits that some have recommended as treatment for all
types of cancer. C.G. Moertel et al., A Clinical Trial of Amygdalin (Laetrile) in the
Treatment of Human Cancer, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201, 201-06 (1982). There have been
no clinical trials demonstrating any clinical efficacy for this substance. Id.; Unproven
Methods of Cancer Management: Laetrile, 41 CA: CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 187, 188-90
(1991) [hereinafter CA]. Furthermore, Laetrile is broken down in the body, producing
cyanide, and severe toxic reactions have been seen with its use. CA at 191.
29. Rutherford,442 U.S. at 544.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 555-56 ("For the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its
potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic
benefit.").
32. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

5

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

118

[Vol. 20

by the FDA to classify marijuana as a drug with no medical indication was
authorized by the CSA and overrode equitable claims of medical
necessity. 33 The Court again declined to consider constitutional claims,
including Fifth Amendment due process claims. 34 Most recently, in
Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause
permitted federal regulation of private, non-commercial, state-sanctioned
production of marijuana.s
The Taxing and Spending Clause 3 6 has also been used to support public
health related measures. The Supreme Court allowed Congress to withhold
highway construction funds from states that did not establish a drinking age
of twenty-one.
The Court held that the general welfare provision of the
Taxing and Spending Clause gave Congress the power to withhold funds to
prevent youthful drinking, 3 8 which Congress found to be contrary to "safe
interstate travel."3 9
The Supreme Court has recognized that states have broader powers than
those of Congress to enact public health legislation. In Compagnie
Francaisev. Louisiana State Board of Health, the Supreme Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not invalidate a state
quarantine law. 40 The Court held that states had constitutionally protected
powers (presumably under the Tenth Amendment) to "enact regulations
protecting the health and safety of the people."4A The Court later held in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Clause did not prohibit states from using their police power to require
vaccination during an epidemic.*42
II. SHOULD SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LIMIT GOVERNMENT
REGULATION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH?
Police power is first mentioned by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden,43 but was not applied by the Court to health regulations until 1902.44
33. Id. at 491.
34. Id. at 494.
35. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (the Court declined to rule on a challenge
to enforcement of the Federal regulatory scheme based on substantive due process).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
37. See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987).
38. Id. at 208.
39. Id.
40. Compagnie Francaise v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902).
41. Id.
42. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1, 39 (1905).
43. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
44. See Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 393 (quarantine laws were held, without
further explanation, not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Three years later, a dissent to the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York
maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment "was [not] designed to interfere
with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order
of the people."4 5 The majority, in dicta, was in partial agreement.46
On the other hand, state courts have upheld freedom from imposition of
medical care as a common law right.4 7 The United States Supreme Court
established a fundamental privacy right limiting government interference
with medical treatment (at least in the context of reproductive medicine) in
a series of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticu 4 8 and Roe v.
Wade. 49 Roe grounded this right on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Roe hints that the privacy right may encompass a
right to access medical care beyond the context of reproduction.o
Eugene Volokh, a distinguished constitutional scholar at the University
of California at Los Angeles, has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
may guarantee even more expansive rights. He suggested that a common
law right of self-defense and constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process should preclude government regulation of therapeutic modalities in
some clinical circumstances.5 1 One such circumstance is the presence of a
45. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Note that
Lochner was decided less than two months after Jacobson and by the identical court. See
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11.
46. The Lochner majority acknowledged the power of states to legislate on behalf of the
safety of employees. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54-56. However, the Court believed that
invocation of police powers was pretextual. See id at 58-60. "There is, in our judgment, no
reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to
safeguard the public health or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a
baker." Id. at 58.
47. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) ("If the operation was
performed without plaintiffs consent, and the circumstances were not such as to justify its
performance without, it was wrongful; and, if it was wrongful, it was unlawful"); Pratt v.
Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 565 (Ill. 1906) (choosing not to recognize an implied consent to a
medical procedure when consent was not given by the patient, no unexpected conditions
developed during the course of the operation, and no emergency arose); Schloendorff v.
Soc'y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years
and of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.").
48. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In overturning a state law
prohibiting use, prescription and sale of contraceptives. Id at 480. The Court discovered a
right of reproductive privacy in the Constitution. Id at 483-85.
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
50. Id. ("The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying [the opportunity to obtain abortion] altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm
medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.").
51. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Paymentfor Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2007).
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fatal disease for which no effective treatment is available. 2 As a
background to discussing this argument, I first shall describe the process of
new drug approval.
Thalidomide, a drug used in Europe to treat nausea in pregnancy, caused
limb deformities in thousands of children whose mothers took it in early
pregnancy.5 3 This experience led to the adoption of legislation requiring the
FDA to certify both safety as well as efficacy of new drugs before they
could be marketed to the public. 5 4 New drugs55 are approved for marketing
through a process stipulated by the FDCA.56 The clinical evaluation
process takes several years. Only 8.9 percent of new drugs first tested on
humans in the United States are ever approved, 7 and cancer drugs are
approved at an even lower rate.58 Agents are selected for human trials on
the basis of their activity against cancer cells grown in tissue culture.59
They may be chemicals, antibodies or vaccines. Cancer drugs are tested in
animals before they are given to humans; the starting dose in human trials
usually is the dose that kills ten percent of mice.60
Three phases of testing are required before the FDA will consider
approval for marketing for human use. Phase I trials utilize escalating drug
doses in order to establish the dose which then will be used in effectiveness
trials. 6 1 Typically, the dose is increased with each sequential group of three
patients until unacceptable toxicity is reached.62 The next lowest dose is
used in Phase II trials. Few patients on Phase I trials have tumor
shrinkage.6 3 Prolonged responses are rare," and I am unaware of a report
52.
53.

See id. at 1828-32.
See William A. Silverman, The Schizophrenic Career of a "Monster Drug," 110

PEDIATRICS 404,405-06 (2002).

54. See Regulatory Information: Legislation, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory
Information/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
55. A "new drug" is "[any] drug .. . not generally recognized, among experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling. . ." 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006).
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(j) (2006).
57. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in New Drug Development: Approval Success Ratesfor
InvestigationalDrugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 297, 298 (2001).

58.
59.

Id. at 301.
See Larry M. Weisenthal, Antineoplastic DrugScreening Belongs in the Laboratory,

Not in the Clinic, 84 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 466,466 (1992).

60.

E. A. Eisenhauer, P. J. O'Dwyer, M. Christian & J. S. Humphrey, Phase I Clinical

TrialDesign in CancerDrugDevelopment, 18 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 684, 685 (2000).

61. See Barry E. Storer, Design andAnalysis of Phase I Clinical Trials, 45 BIOMETRICS
925,925 (1989).
62. Id at 926.
63. Elizabeth Horstmann et al., Risks and Benefits of Phase I Oncology Trials, 1991
Through 2002, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 895, 899 (2005). This study reports a response rate of
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of a patient on a Phase I trial who has ever been cured of cancer. On the
other hand, severe toxicity is common.65 Clinical improvement is not the
goal of Phase I trials.
Phase II trials treat a small number of patients with a single kind of
recurrent cancer. 66 The goals of a Phase II trial are to determine both
whether the drug is effective against that kind of cancer and to further
elucidate the drug's toxicity.67
Drugs effective against a specific type of cancer in Phase II trials are
used in Phase III trials. These are randomized trials comparing the new
drug against standard treatment of newly diagnosed cancer.6 8 Phase III
trials are performed after Phase II evidence suggesting effectiveness of the
drug has been obtained, and are intended to gather the additional
information about effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the
overall risk-benefit relationship of the drug.6 9 Such trials measure the
therapeutic efficacy, the toxicity, and the impact on patient quality of life of
the new regimen and compared these with standard treatment using
sophisticated statistical techniques. 70 The new drug is marketed only with
FDA approval after three phases of required government testing on
humans.n
Volokh argued that this scheme for drug approval violates a fundamental
right of medical self-defense, at least in patients with a fatal disease for
which no effective treatment is known.72 Analogizing the threat of deadly

4.4 percent for patients on Phase I trials of single new drugs. Id.
64. See A. Italiano et al., Treatment Outcome and Survival in Participantsof Phase I
Oncology Trials Carried Out From 2003 to 2006 at Institut Gustave Roussy, 19 ANN.
ONCOLOGY 787, 789 (2008). The study reported a median of 2.3 months to cancer
progression in patients on Phase I cancer trials, and a median 8.7 months until death. Since
patients had to be quite stable to enter the trials, most would likely have done well for
several months in any event. Id. Thus, these drugs generally have minimal effect, if any, on
survival and time to progression. Id.
65. Horstmann, supra note 63, at 899 (reporting a death rate of 0.49 percent and a Grade
4 toxicity rate of 14.3 percent for patients in Phase I cancer trials).
66. John A. Blessing, Design, Analysis, and Interpretation of Chemotherapy Trials in
Gynecologic Cancer, CHEMOTHERAPY OF GYNECOLOGIC CANCER 49, 55-56 (Gunter Deppe,

ed., 1990).
67. Id.
68. See Investigational New Drug Application, 21 CFR 321.21(c) (2009).
69. Abigail 1, 445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reversed on en banc review in
Abigail 2,495 F.3d 695).
70. See example M. Tiseo, M. Bartolotti, F. Gelsomino, and P. Bordi, Emerging Role of
Fefitinib in the Treatment ofNon-small-cell Lung Cancer,4 DRUG DEs. DEVEL. THER. 2010
81 (May 25, 2010); availableat http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2880339/.
7 1. Id.
72. Volokh, supra note 51, at 1815.
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disease to the threat of lethal force from humans or animals,73 Volokh
proposed that those with terminal illnesses be allowed to access post-Phase
I drugs. He rooted this right in substantive due process.74 Citing Supreme
Court case law 75 that he believed embodied a right of self-defense in "this
Nation's history and tradition," 76 Volokh tried to escape the problem that
lethal self-defense is ordinarily allowed only in response to an imminent
threat 77 by "construing imminence as simply requiring a present medical
threat."
This doctrine was asserted judicially by Judge Rogers in Abigail 1, which
reversed a dismissal for failure to state a claim of a suit to allow terminally
ill cancer patients access to drugs that had completed Phase I testing.79 The
Abigail I court held that regulations limiting access to these drugs impinged
on a fundamental liberty interest based on Fifth Amendment substantive
due process guarantees. 80 Applying strict scrutiny, the court remanded the
case for determination of whether barring access by terminally ill patients to
these drugs was "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest."81
The Abigail 1 court's analysis began with the Glucksberg two-prong test,
which states that a fundamental right must be "objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition," (deep roots) "and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it] were sacrificed" (ordered liberty). 2 Applying a third Glucksberg
requirement that a fundamental right be carefully defined, the Abigail 1
court defined the putative fundamental right as a "[right] to privacy, liberty,
and life [which includes] the right of terminally ill patients, acting on a
doctor's advice, to obtain potentially life-saving medication when no
alternative treatment approved by the government is available." 84
The Abigail 1 court found deep roots in the right to self-defense,8 5 the
73. See id. at 1817-18.
74. See id. at 1818-19.
75. See id. at 1819-21.
76. Id. at 1819 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
77. Id. at 1823.
78. Id. at 1824.
79. See Abigail 1,445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
80. See id. at 472 (citing Glucksberg 521 U.S. at 721; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
81. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Reno, 507 U.S. at 302).
82. Id. at 476-77 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
83. See Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 721.
84. Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 478.
85. Id. at 480.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss1/7

10

Jacobs: Is State Power to Protect Health Compatible with Substantive Due

2011]

State Power to Protect Health

123

86
doctrine of necessity, and the common law liability in tort for interfering
with efforts to rescue or to preserve a life. 8 7 It found that the "right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law" 8 was implicit in ordered liberty. The court analogized the
right, whose recognition the plaintiffs sought, to a right recognized in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health89 to refuse life
sustaining care. 90 The Abigail 1 court mistakenly characterized the Cruzandefined right as one demanding strict scrutiny.9 1
An en banc review (Abigail 2) reversed the Abigail I decision. 9 2 In her
dissent, Judge Rogers found an additional basis for access to post-Phase I
drugs in the right to access life-saving procedures found in Roe v. Wade. 9 3
She characterized this right as distinct from, and more powerful than, the
right of reproductive privacy that grounds a right to termination of
pregnancy under most other circumstances. 94
Although the Abigail 2 court ultimately rejected the medical self-defense
argument, the two decisions by Judge Rogers favoring the plaintiffs are a
good starting point for discussion. First, these opinions present plausible
arguments for the use of the substantive due process doctrine to overcome
public health laws that restrict individual liberty. 9 5 Ultimately, they are not
convincing for various reasons, some of which I shall elucidate. Second,
the facts of this case are unusual in that both sides asserted similar
interests-amelioration of the same kind of advanced cancer. This

8 6. Id.
87. Seeidat481.
88. Id. at 484, (citing Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)
(quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))).
89. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
90. Abigail 1, 445 F.3d 470, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("The logical corollary is that an
individual must also be free to decide for herself whether to assume any known or unknown
risks of taking a medication that might prolong her life.").
91. Id (In fact, the Cruzan Court did not demand strict scrutiny; see infra pp. 19-20).
92. See Abigail 2, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
93. See id. at 719 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65
(1973)).
94. See id at 721, (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
95. As does the prestige of the court and the eminence of the judges who supported the
substantive due process argument. Both Judges Judith Rogers and Douglas Ginsburg have
served as Chief Judge of the court, and Judge Ginsburg was nominated for the Supreme
Court by President Ronald Reagan in 1987. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:
Judith Ann Wilson Rogers, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/
public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Dec. 5, 2010); BiographicalDirectory of Federal Judges:
Douglas Howard Ginburg, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/
home.nsf/hisj (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
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fortuitous feature facilitates analysis of the competing claims of public
necessity and individual rights. For this reason I ultimately shall assume,
arguendo, that the law supports a right to medical self-defense, and will
show that this is insufficient to overcome state power to enact public health
legislation in the way that Volokh and Judge Rogers propose.
The Abigail 1 court misconstrued the purpose of Phase I trials and the
underlying science.9 6 There is little reason to believe that a drug that has
cleared Phase I will be more likely to prolong the life of a terminal cancer
patient than will Laetrile or popcom. Indeed, it is almost certain that
making these agents available will do much more harm than good, since all
are toxic and few are efficacious. Even when efficacious, the beneficial
effect on terminal cancer patients is slight.97 Nevertheless, the aura of
science may persuade vulnerable patients to grasp at the straw of using such
substances. It is not clear why a right of medical self-defense would require
the government to allow availability setting of substances known to be
harmful and which are not beneficial.
On the other hand, adoption of the doctrine of medical self-defense is
likely to impede identification of effective drugs at the expense of the health
of people who would benefit from the small minority of post-Phase I drugs
that prove to be safe and effective. Daniel Meron, then General Counsel for
the Department of Health and Human Services, emphasizes that allowing
sale of post-Phase I drugs will discourage patients from enrolling in clinical
trials, 98 which are needed to select effective substances from the large pool
of candidate drugs. There also are legal problems with this doctrine. First,
most courts that have ruled on the issue have held that the FDCA preempts
96.

VINCENT T. DEVITA JR. ET AL., CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY

513-14 (5th ed. 1997). Phase I trials do not establish safety or efficacy. Such trials only
"determine a dose that is appropriate for Phase 11 trials." Richard M. Simon, Chapter 20:
Clinical Trials in Cancer, in 1 VINCENT T. DAVITA, JR. ET AL., CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY, 513 (5th ed. 1997). Only three to six patients in a Phase I trial
receive the dose that will be used in Phase II trials and another three receive a higher dose,
so the nature and extent of toxicity is not clearly understood except for the type of toxicity
that characterizes an overdose. Id. at 514. When unacceptable toxicity is reached at a given
dose level, requiring three to six patients, the previous dose is used for Phase 11trials. See id.
Furthermore, there generally is no reason to believe these drugs are efficacious.
Effectiveness of a drug against one kind of cancer does not predict efficacy against other
kind. A fortiori, a drug which kills animal cancers or cancer cells in the test tube is unlikely
to affect any kind of human cancer. The vast majority of these drugs are never released, and
it is almost unheard of for Phase I drugs to cure cancer or prolong life. See id. The success
of cancer drug development, therefore, depends on screening large numbers of substances to
find a few effective agents. See id.
97. Dean Gesme, Should Terminally Ill Patients Have the Right to Take Drugs that Pass
Phase I Testing? No., 335 BR. MED. J. 479, 479 (2007).
98. Daniel Meron, Balancing Government Regulation Against Access to Drugs, 37
SETON HALL L. REV. 929, 931 (2007).
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state tort remedies; and that removing this preemption and exposing
pharmaceutical manufacturers to product liability suits might reduce the
availability of investigational drugs. 99
Second, to the extent that the government finances health care, and
especially if it guarantees care for all, a right to medical self-defense could
support a constitutional requirement that the government pay for any
treatment for a serious illness that a patient wants and that some physician
believes may conceivably benefit the patient. A Comment in the Tennessee
Law Review argues, for example, that if the government both monopolizes
health care and rations its availability, it thereby traduces patients' due
process rights. 00 Furthermore, the self-defense and necessity analogies
extend beyond seeking treatment for terminal illness. Deadly force can be
used in self-defense against situations other than attempted murder,
provided another person uses or threatens violence. 0 ' Volokh's selfdefense analogy should be broad enough to apply to cover any treatment for
any disease when (1) the disease can causes mortality or serious morbidity,
and (2) some authority proposes that such treatment might be effective.
There is no shortage of groups that have succeeded in acquiring statutory
rights to be paid for their services of unproven merit. 0 2 The medical selfdefense doctrine would allow advocates of unproven care to bypass the
democratic process and obtain payment for the groups' practitioners
through constitutional challenges in court. The medical self-defense
doctrine might mandate payment for any treatment of serious illnesses, even
if cost-ineffective or totally futile, as long as a patient and his practitioner,
whether a physician, chiropractor, or other professed healer, believes it
Constitutionalizing this right could prevent
might be beneficial.
government health benefit programs from taking measures to control the
costs of medical care. Thus, the creation of a right of medical self-defense
might make it impractical or impossible for the government to pay for
individual medical care. Admittedly, libertarian proponents of the doctrine
of medical self-defense might not be averse to such an outcome.
99. Id. at 938-39.
100. See, J. Paul Singleton, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: How the Due Process
Clause May Limit Comprehensive Health CareReform, 77 TENN. L. REv 413 (2010).
101. Volokh, supra note 51, at 1817, (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)-(b)
(McKinney 2006)); Model Penal Code § 3.04 cmt. 4(a), at 48 & note 35 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985) (as adopted in 1962).
102. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (g)(21) (McKinney 2006) (note that there are two
paragraph 21's; the appropriate paragraph is the second of these), N.Y. INs. LAW § 3221
(k)(1 1) (McKinney 2006) (note that there are two paragraph IlI's; the appropriate paragraph
is the second of these), and N.Y. INs. LAW § 4303 (y) (McKinney 2007), which collectively
require insurance coverage for chiropractors, and N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. § 305 (3)
(McKinney 2006), which requires payment for "necessary" chiropractic care.
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Finally, 0. Carter Snead of the University of Notre Dame stated "selfdefense is not a fruitful analogy." 0 3 This is because "[t]he proposed right
to medical self-defense does not involve the use of force against an
aggressor, but rather the freedom to acquire certain instrumentalities of
therapeutic self-help."' 04 Snead observed that disease is not an aggressor
and the danger is not imminent. 0 5
Although the medical self-defense doctrine did not prevail in Abigail 2, it
could be successfully revived in the future. A court inclined to expansive
interpretations of substantive due process could revive this doctrine,
especially if the plaintiff were more likely than the Abigail plaintiffs to
derive tangible benefit from nullification of a public health law. A
differently constituted Supreme Court may develop a more expansive
approach to the discovery of fundamental rights than Glucksberg provides.
Consequently, this article will accept, arguendo, a right of medical selfdefense that is putatively violated by various demonstrably effective public
health laws. Using facts similar to the Abigail facts, as well as hypothetical
situations that change the facts slightly, this article will demonstrate that
substantive due process still does not provide a basis for nullifying effective
public health laws.
It will first show that public health laws are not subject to strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has not required that remedies under public health laws
be narrowly tailored. For our purposes here, the applicable standard will be
"enhanced public health scrutiny." The classes of individuals will include:
(1) who will definitely incur illness or injury under specific situations; but
(2) who cannot be identified before the adverse event; and (3) whose health
problems could be prevented or ameliorated if a public health law were in
effect. Since these individuals cannot be identified in advance, this article
characterizes them as an "inchoate class," and will argue that protection of
members of inchoate classes is a compelling government interest. The
Constitution allows states to protect this interest by enacting public health
laws that pass enhanced public health scrutiny.
III. ENHANCED PUBLIC HEALTH SCRUTINY

The Supreme Court held early in the Twentieth Century that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not preclude states from enacting laws that
103. 0. Carter Snead, UnenumeratedRights and the Limits ofAnalogy: A Critiqueofthe
Right to Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7 (2007).
104. Id.
105. See id at 10 (observing that the doctrine of necessity does not support access to
post-phase I drugs because, first, the actor must "believe in good faith that the unlawful act
will remedy the greater evil" and, second, that the legislature must not have "already spoken
to the proper disposition of the choice of evils in question").
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protect the public from epidemics using quarantine06 and compulsory
vaccination.' 0 7 I have noted elsewhere 08 that Jacobson v. Massachusetts
constrained the power of the government to compel vaccination in four
ways, characterized by James G. Hodge and Lawrence 0. Gostenl09 as
follows:
(1) public health necessity... police powers must be based on the
"necessit[y] of the case" and could not be exercised in "an arbitrary,
unreasonable manner" or "go10so far beyond what was reasonably required
for the safety of the public;"
(2) reasonable means... a reasonable relationship between the public
health intervention and the achievement of a legitimate public health
objective.'11

. . . [t]he methods adopted must have a "real or substantial

relation" to protection of the public health, and cannot be "a plain,
palpable invasion of rights;"112
(3) proportionality-"[T]he police power of a state ... may be exerted in
such circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in
particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent
wrong and oppression." 13 Thus, a public health regulation may be
unconstitutional if the intervention is gratuitously onerous or unfair; and
(4) harm avoidance-[T]he measure itself should not pose a health risk
to its subject. . . [R]equiring a person to be immunized
despite knowing
1 14
harm would be "cruel and inhuman in the last degree."
The first of these constraints, public health necessity, speaks to the
required government interest in the health matter. Courts grant great
deference in this area. Necessity could mean "necessary to achieve a
legitimate or important health goal." No known case law that invalidates a
public health law as being unnecessary exists. Rather, courts in vaccination
cases appear to construe public health necessity to mean "a highly desirable

106. See Compagnie Francaise v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 397 (1902).
107. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
108. See generally Allan J. Jacobs, Needles and Notebooks: The Limits of Requiring
Immunization for School Attendance (2009) (unpublished) (on file with the Hamline Law
Review).
109. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical,Social, andLegal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 856-57 (2001).
110. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Id. at 31.
113. Id. at 38.
114. Id. at 38-39.
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public health interest," rather than applying the dictionary definition of
necessary meaning "absolutely needed."" 5
The subsequent three Jacobson principles addressed the constraints for
achieving the public health necessity." 6 The requirement is not for a
narrowly tailored remedy, but for one that is proportional in its impact and
reasonable in its means.' The Jacobson Court's only absolute requirement
was that required measures should not knowingly impose "cruel and
inhuman" harm on a burdened person." 8
The Supreme Court has implicitly followed this approach in its
subsequent jurisprudence. In Cruzan, the Court considered an appeal to
terminate tube feeding to a woman in a persistent vegetative state."l 9 The
Court found a right to refuse treatment is a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest. 12 0 However, it did not apply strict scrutiny in this context. It
allowed states to require that decision-making surrogates demonstrate by
"clear and convincing evidence" that their instructions represented the
previously expressed wishes of the incompetent patient to discontinue care
under these circumstances.121 The state interest in "the protection and
preservation of human life" 22 allows it to impose this standard "to guard
against potential abuses in such situations." 2 3
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that the Court did not define the
level of scrutiny it applied to the right to refuse care.' 24 Brennan wanted the
Court to apply strict scrutiny,' 25 and dissented in part because the Court
failed to do so.1 2 6 He criticized the failure of the majority to apply this
115.

See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (quoting

WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)).

116. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-40.
117. Id.at28.
118. Id.at38-39.
119. The Cruzan Court defined persistent vegetative state. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990), note 1 (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987))
("Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal
controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary ventilation. It
maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level
conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or
awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.").
120. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Id. at 280.
123. Id. at 281.
124. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court, however, avoids discussing either
the measure of that liberty interest or its application.").
125. See id. at 304-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a requirement imposed
by a State 'significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be
upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to
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Instead, the Cruzan Court balanced the fundamental liberty interest
against the state's interest in preserving health. 12 8 It cited the public health
interest that trumped individual rights in Jacobsonl29 and in Breithaupt v.
Abram. 3 o Even Justice Brennan, citing Jacobson, acknowledged that the
right to refuse care is not absolute.131 Justice Brennan also agreed with the
majority' 32 that Missouri had "a parenspatriae interest in providing Nancy
Cruzan, now incompetent, with as accurate as possible a determination of
how she would exercise her rights under these circumstances." 3 3
Thus, the Cruzan Court found that an important right had to yield to state
police power in a matter of public health interest. It did not define the
nature of its scrutiny according to the paradigm of rational basis,
intermediate,13 4 or strict scrutiny. Granting maximum deference to patients'
wishes would have required that states apply a substituted judgment
standard 35 to a surrogate's decision to terminate treatment (expressed
legally as allowing proof of the patient's desires by preponderance of

effectuate only those interests,"' (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, (1978))).
127. See id. at 301-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 279.
129. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (allowing compulsory
vaccination at the time of a smallpox epidemic).
130. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (holding that a state safety
interest in compelling venipuncture of drivers for ethanol determinations overcame a
constitutionally protected right of bodily integrity). Cruzan also cites three other cases in
which substantial liberty interest were opposed to decisions made, at least partly, for
protection or promotion of health. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79. Harperwas not on point, in
my opinion, because it used rational basis analysis to permit forced medication of a
psychotic prisoner because of penologic concerns. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
224-26 (1990). Vitek v. Jones, dealt with involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental
hospital, and was decided on procedural due process grounds in favor of the prisoner seeking
to avoid transfer. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980). Because this paper discusses
the extent of procedural due process rights, Vitek is not germane either. Finally, Parham v.
JR. is another Due Process case, this time finding in favor of the state with regard to
procedures for admission of a child to a mental healthcare facility with the consent of the
parents, in spite of "a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
medical treatment." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
131. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the right to be free of
unwanted medical intervention, like other constitutionally protected interests, may not be
absolute.").
132. Id. at 281. ("[T]here will, of course, be some unfortunate situations in which family
members will not act to protect a patient A State is entitled to guard against potential abuses
in such situations.") (internal quotes and citation omitted).
133. See id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
135. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
99-100 (5th ed. 2001).
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evidence).136 Rather, states are allowed to impose a pure autonomy (or
expressed wishes) standard137 (requiring clear and convincing evidence as
to what the patient would want done under the circumstances)."'
Planned Parenthood v. Casey expresses the standard of scrutiny that
currently applies to state regulation of pregnancy termination; a standard
that falls outside the usual paradigm of rational basis, intermediate, or strict
scrutiny.' 3 9 Casey demands that regulations not place an undue burden on a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability. 14 0 This
represents a retreat from an older strict scrutiny standard set in Roe v.
Wade.141 The Roe Court had grounded a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy in a substantive due process right of privacy,142 which is not,
however, an unqualified right.143
The Casey Court allowed states greater leeway to limit the rights Roe
granted to women to terminate pregnancy. It held that "[o]nly where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of [this right],"
(emphasis added).144 An "undue burden" is "a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable

136. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belcherton State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d. 417,
434 (1977).
137. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 135, at 100-02.
138. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981). See also Helen L. Siegal,
Notes and Comments, In re Conroy: A Limited Right to Withhold or Withdraw Artificial
Nourishment, 6 PACE L. REv. 219 (1986) (for a dated, but clear, discussion of standards for
surrogate decision-making).
139. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
140. Id. at 874.
141. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142. See id. at 153.
143. See id. at 154. See also, generally, id. at 153 (arguing that a right to privacy is a
required that laws impinging on this Due Process right); id. at 155 ( "[T]he court has held
that regulation limiting these (Due Process) rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest."'); id. (stating that limiting the right of privacy is subject to strict scrutiny,
"justified only by a 'compelling state interest,"' and that "legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."). However, the state
develops an interest in the health of the mother sufficiently compelling to allow state
regulation of termination of pregnancy at the end of the first trimester of pregnancy
(approximately thirteen weeks after the last menstrual period. Id. "With respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb." See id. at 163. Furthermore, the state acquires a compelling
interest in fetal life when a fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb." Id.
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
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fetus,"l45 which remained unconstitutional. 14 6
The Cruzan and Casey rulings are compatible with the Jacobson
standard of scrutiny, which requires that: (1) the regulation must address a
well-founded threat to public health, tantamount to a compelling
government interest; (2) there is excellent empirical evidence that the
proposed regulation will result in improved public health vis-A-vis failure to
enact the proposed regulation; (3) the overall burden of the proposed
regulation-relating both to health and non-health burdens-may not
exceed the public health benefits; and (4) there must be exemption from the
regulation for individuals who, for unusual reasons, would incur
disproportionate adverse impact if they were subjected to the regulation.147
First, as discussed above, Jacobson's public health necessity is
equivalent to a well-founded threat to public health. Courts interpret public
necessity broadly. For example, lower courts have upheld compulsory
immunization even for certain childhood illnesses (such as rubella and
measles) that only occasionally have grave consequences. 14 8
Second, any public health law must be justified by a favorable riskbenefit calculus. Effectiveness of the measure in question (smallpox
vaccination) was stressed in Jacobsonl4 9 and was taken for granted in cases
such as Casey (abortion procedures result in pregnancy termination), and
The Jacobson
Cruzan (termination of feeding results in death).' 50
proportionality prong, as well as the harm avoidance prong, suggest that the
benefits must exceed the risks.15 '
145. Id. at 877.
146. See id. The Casey Court deemed a spousal notification requirement to be an undue
burden. Id. at 887-88; see also id. at 900-01 (the Court also found that a requirement of a
woman reporting to the state detailed information in regards to the pregnancy and abortion,
some of which would be made available to the public, was also unduly burdensome). But
see id. at 882 (arguing that state requirements that did not constitute an undue burden include
rules that physicians must inform patients of fetal consequences of the termination
procedure); id. at 884 (arguing it is not an undue burden for a state to require that a patient's
informed consent must be personally elicited by a physician); id. at 885-87 (arguing that that
a state's mandate of a 24-hour waiting period between consent and the termination
procedure, although a "particular burden" for some women, was not a substantial obstacle
for the group as a whole, and therefore did not amount to an undue burden); id. at 899-900
(arguing that states have the right to require parental notification, provided there was an
adequate judicial bypass procedure).
147. See generally, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
148. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d. 218 (Miss. 1979); Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F.
Supp. 1259 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Farina v. Bd. of Ed., 116 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2000);
Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
149. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845; Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 267-68
(1990).
151. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
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Third, everyone has interests other than health interests. The total
burden of health interests and other interests cannot be greater than the
benefit conferred by the public health law. Limitation on patients' scope of
action imposed by Casey and on surrogates' power to make decisions
imposed by Cruzan was justified in part by non-medical concerns. In
Cruzan, the court relied on state interests in preserving life and avoiding
error (possibly a euphemistic way of characterizing a state interest in
preventing a surrogate from agreeing to a patient's death for the surrogate's
own benefit, rather than out of respect for the patient's wishes).' 52 In
Casey, the state interest in "profound respect for the life of the unborn," 5 3
allows regulation if there is no undue burden, even if the regulation has "no
direct relation to [the woman's] health." 54
Health-related laws may impose non-health burdens, including financial
burdens not only on the laws' beneficiaries, but on burdened parties that do
not benefit from the laws. For example, quarantines imposed to prevent
epidemics may interfere with the ability of the quarantined person to earn a
livelihood. Another example is the requirement, whose object is the safety
of the flying public, that commercial pilots must have a current certificate
verifying that they have passed specific medical examinations.' 5 5 Because
of such impact of public health laws beyond the scope of health, the
reasonable means requirement demands that those subject to regulation
cannot be subject to unreasonable deprivation unrelated to health issues.
It is important to note that the Roe Court cut the Gordian knot of possible
fetal interests and rights by holding that a fetus is not a person.'s6 The Roe
Court acknowledged that "[i]f this suggestion of [fetal] personhood is
established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to
life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth]
Amendment."' 57 This Court, therefore, held that "the word 'person,' as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."'
Both
152. There have been other cases addressing the doctor patient relationship in which the
issues were not public health issues. See, for example, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 705-06, 722-23 (1997) and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 248-49 (2006), both of
which deal with laws regulating physician-assisted suicide by competent patients. Gonzales,
in any event, was not decided on constitutional issues.
153. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
154. Id. at 882.
155. For the requirements for each type of medical certificate see 14 C.F.R. § 61.23
(2009) (for the requirement that pilots hold a medical certificate) and 14 C.F.R. § 67.3
(2008) (establishing that a person who meets the medical standards prescribed in this part,
based on medical examination and evaluation of the person's history and condition, is
entitled to an appropriate medical certificate).
156. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158.
157. Id. at 156-57.
158. Id. at 158.
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enhanced public scrutiny and the concept of inchoate class discussed in the
next section apply only to the interests of persons. By denying personhood
to fetuses, Roe denies the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
unborn.
Finally, the Jacobson constraint of harm avoidance requires that
individuals who possess atypical characteristics that subject them to specific
and identifiable harm from a proposed regulation must be exempted from
that regulation. This means, for example, that people with a known serious
allergy to a vaccine must be exempted from compulsory vaccination
requirements.
This completes discussion of the rights of those burdened by public
health laws. The article will now discuss the beneficiaries of those laws.
Many such beneficiaries of public health laws are individuals whose health
would diminish in the future but for such a law, but who cannot be
identified until their health is impaired. That is the subject of the next
section.
IV. INCHOATE CLASSES

A. PropertiesofInchoate Classes
Communities do not contract diseases or sustain injuries; individual
people do. One usually cannot identify who will get sick or incur an injury
until the adverse effect occurs. Such people may thus constitute an inchoate
class of people that definitely exists, but whose members cannot be
identified at the time measures are contemplated to protect their health.
This section will demonstrate that rights-based claims against public health
legislation may be overcome when satisfaction of such claims would violate
fundamental health-related interests of members of an inchoate class. First,
I must describe the characteristics of such inchoate classes.
An inchoate class with fundamental health interests (hereinafter
"inchoate class") is comprised of one or more individuals who possess three
characteristics. First, members of the class will incur a well defined disease
or injury in the absence of a specific public health law. Second, that injury
will be averted as a proximate effect of that law.I 5 9 Third, members of the
159. The element of cause and effect is essential. For example, assume that college
graduates have lower rates of heart disease than do non-graduates. Press Release, Am. Heart
Ass'n, Higher Education Predicts Better Cardiovascular Health Outcomes in High-Income
Countries, But Not In Low- and Middle-Income Countries, (Sept. 7, 2010),
http://www.newsroom.heart.org/index.php?s-43&item= 1106. College graduation may not
be a cause of the lower rate. The finding may be a statistical artifact. It may also be the case
that college graduation and low disease rates are proximate effects of a third phenomenon.
Because there is not a well-established causal effect between less school and more disease,
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class cannot be identified from among a broader class of individuals until
they actually suffer the adverse event.
The adverse event that the inchoate class will experience must be
empirically inevitable. The event may not be hypothetical. Rather, it must
be certain that some unknown members of a larger class of people (which
larger class may be either the entire population or a large segment of the
population, such as all women, or all coal miners) will experience the event.
It is not required that the event be logically necessary, but only that it can
be empirically concluded that some people will experience it. An example
of logical necessity of an adverse effect would be a situation in which a
disease affects one hundred people, with sufficient medicine available to
cure only ninety. The other ten inevitably will die. These unfortunate ten
people form an inchoate class if we do not know which individuals will not
be able to obtain the drug. We can enact a law to compel production of ten
more doses of medicine, and by doing so we can so prevent those ten
people from dying.
Empirical necessity sufficient to define an inchoate class exists when
there is an extremely high probability of an adverse event occurring. For
example, at least 150 men per 100,000 (about 225,000 men) have been
diagnosed in the United States with prostate cancer every year since
1990.160 It is so likely that some American men will be diagnosed with
prostate cancer next year that reasonable people will assume this will
happen. This is true even though the conclusion is based on high statistical
probability rather than on logical necessity. If a public health law would
prevent some cases of prostate cancer, then some of these unidentified
225,000 men who would otherwise get the disease next year would
constitute an inchoate class.
Members of an inchoate class do not have to be found totally randomly
among the total population. They can be members of a broad demographic
group defined by factors such as age, occupation, residence, or gender. All
members of inchoate classes involving prostate cancer will be men, for
example.
The larger group containing the inchoate class must be
sufficiently larger than the inchoate class itself so that it is impossible to
identify the specific individuals whose health will be impaired.

those who did not graduate from college but who will experience an increase in heart disease
do not constitute an inchoate class that would benefit from legislation to increase college
graduation rates for the purpose of preventing heart disease. It follows that such legislation
would not be public health legislation, as this also requires a well-established causal
relationship to survive enhanced public health scrutiny.
160. See, e.g., NAT'L CANCER INST., Surveillance Epidemiology End Results,
http://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975 2006/browse csr.php?section=23&page=sect_23_table.04.ht
ml (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
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To develop the concept of the inchoate class with fundamental health
interests, I propose a hypothetical situation similar to the Abigail facts,
though using a fictitious disease and assuming certain facts to remove
complexity and ambiguity.
Cardizap
The state of Randaynburg has an identical Pure Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Law to the U.S. Federal statute that, for obscure reasons,
preempts the Federal statute. Randaynberg is unique in having a high
incidence of heart cancer, a disease virtually unknown anywhere else in
the world. One in 200 residents of Randaynberg is diagnosed with heart
cancer each year, and five percent eventually die of the disease. Removal
of the heart is not feasible, so chemotherapy is the only treatment. No
drug has ever been curative. The best drugs are only effective against
thirty percent of people with heart cancer and prolong life an average of
only nine months. The Amber Grail Foundation seeks an injunction to
allow patients who have used all other drugs on the market to have access
to a compound called Cardizap. The dose-limiting toxicity of Cardizap
(i.e., the common side effect produced by an overdose) has been
determined in Phase I testing, but the full toxicity spectrum is unknown.
Furthermore, there has been no observed effect against heart cancer
except for a two-month partial remission in one of thirty patients who
received Cardizap for heart cancer. Prior experience has shown that
allowing access to drugs that have only had Phase I testing diverts
patients from clinical trials, thus retarding accurate evaluation of efficacy
by six to twelve months. State regulators have reasonablM estimated that
this delay would result in an additional 1,000 QALY's per year than
would result from a policy of allowing the wider access to Cardizap
sought by Amber Grail. The beneficial effect would be spread among
1,200 patients annually. It estimates that no more than ten QALY's
would be achieved by allowing administration of Cardizap to patients
with heart cancer for whom no other treatment is available. Some time in
the future, Coraz6n Herzl will get heart cancer, but there is no way to
know this until she actually gets the disease and is diagnosed. Her cancer
will respond to Cardizap but we cannot know this either, unless and until
she gets the drug. In the long run, however, Coraz6n Herzl or others like
her will suffer from abandonment of the drug development program.
161. UK Cochlear Implant Study Group, Cochlear Implantation in Postlingually
Deafened Adults II: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 25 EAR & HEARING 336, 338 (2004) ("A

QALY is a measure of duration of life weighted by quality of life. If a person lives for 10 yr
in a state with a utility of 0.2 [i.e., with an eighty percent reduction of quality of life], the
person has lived 2 QALYs. If an intervention improves the utility of the patient's state to 0.6
and sustains the improvement for 10 yr, then the patient has gained 4 QALYs (= 10 x [0.6 0.2]).").
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The inchoate class here consists of those who will get heart cancer during
the six to twelve months between the date Cardizap would be approved if
the approval process proceeds as the statute anticipates, and the date it
would be approved if early availability of Cardizap to terminal patients
retards the approval process. We do not know in advance exactly who will
fall into this class. However, if the government allows unlimited use of
Cardizap then people such as Coraz6n Herzl will suffer.
Not all scenarios in which possible members of an inchoate class seek
benefit involve maintenance or suppression of government regulatory
activity, as in the Cardizap scenario. In the following scenario the facts
have changed so that benefit to the inchoate class requires that the
government compel action by a private actor.
Bristlecone Extract
Bristlecone pine extract was found to cure heart cancer. The drug is
harmless enough to justify over-the-counter sales, but it is rare and hard
to obtain. Paul Ronald Bach has purchased all of the bristlecone pine
plantations in the world, as well as the patent on the extraction process.
Bach is a mystic who is hostile to Western medicine. He sells his entire
crop for use in cosmetics, though he would get a better price from
pharmaceutical companies. As a result, there is no drug available to treat
heart cancer patients. Bach's patent expires in ten years. It will take four
years to synthesize bristlecone pine extract in the laboratory using a
different process. Tin Woodsman recently was diagnosed with heart
cancer. He has read about the concept of medical self-defense and would
like to force Bach to supply the extract for medicinal use. Furthermore,
his siblings, Lead Woodsman and Germanium Woodsman, believe they
may be members of an inchoate class of persons who will develop heart
cancer.
Conceptually, legal remedies to protect the interests of plaintiffs with a
medical self-interest claim may require state action, state restraint, state
compulsion of private action, or state prohibition or regulation of private
action. Judicial intervention in the Bristlecone scenario may be less
appealing to a libertarian than to a liberal; the reverse is true for the
Cardizap scenario. Both challenges may rely on a concept of medical selfdefense with equal plausibility.
B. The Inchoate Class and Public Health Legislation
Can public health laws survive a robust substantive due process
challenge, such as an argument based on the medical self-defense doctrine?
There are cogent pragmatic reasons for such laws. Potential members of

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss1/7

24

Jacobs: Is State Power to Protect Health Compatible with Substantive Due

2011]

State Power to Protect Health

137

inchoate groups may not proactively seek judicial remedies for their
exposure to health hazards. Alternatively, a hazard such as an epidemic
may be so pressing that severe damage will occur if the government does
not promptly deal with the threat.
If achieving certain health outcomes is an interest sufficiently important
to form the basis of a fundamental right such as medical self-defense, it
should also be sufficiently important and fundamental to form the basis of a
compelling government interest in enacting laws to protect that personal
interest. How can courts resolve a challenge, based on a fundamental right,
to a law upholding this fundamental interest in protecting susceptible
individuals against an adverse health outcome?
Beginning with the proposition advanced in the previous section, that a
law is facially constitutional if it meets the conditions of enhanced public
health scrutiny. Analysis of the law and challenges to the law must be able
to address both health-related and non-health related burdens of laws
limiting rights for public health purposes. The right to protect oneself
against a serious disease is fundamental, since critical life and liberty
interests are at stake. But if a person's interest in combating a fatal illness
is important enough to undergird a fundamental right, the same interest is
important enough to ground a compelling government interest in aiding a
person with a fatal illness in combating that illness.
A government that uses its police power to enact public health laws is, in
effect, thereby acting on behalf of an inchoate class and its members against
threats to their health. It is providing them with medical self-defense they
cannot provide themselves because they do not know they will get sick.
Protection from health threats is a fundamental interest of inchoate class
members, because these threats inevitably will traduce their life and liberty
interests. The government thus acts to defend fundamental life and liberty
interests of those who otherwise would be harmed, but who cannot be
identified until they incur the harm. Such action comprises a compelling
government interest.
The Cardizap scenario fortuitously opposes two sides claiming the same
health interest-relief of heart cancer. Accessing drugs immediately on the
one hand, and orderly drug development on the other hand, are both
advocated on the basis of an interest in helping patients with this disease.
However, different individuals will experience relief depending on which
policy is adopted. Each side can equally well base its claim on medical
self-defense. Amber Grail claims that the right of self-defense guarantees
its constituents' access to Cardizap. The government counters that it has a
compelling interest in restriction of Cardizap to clinical trials in order to
protect the fundamental interest held by an inchoate class, with members
such as Herzl, in facilitating development of drugs against heart cancer.
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Members of the inchoate class have the same interest in defending
themselves against cancer as do those who already have the disease. But
since they do not know who they are, someone else must represent their
interests. The government is the only entity that plausibly can do this.
Since both sides in the Cardizap dispute have the same interests and the
same right of medical self-defense, resolution of the dispute in the Cardizap
scenario rests on a balance of equities. The issue is empirical: which of the
two proposed solutions to the conflict will do more to alleviate the overall
harm caused by heart cancer? Under the facts that are presented in the
Cardizap scenario, the current rules for drug development will aid the
inchoate class more than the immediate release of Cardizap will aid those
who now have cancer. Therefore, Herzl and the government can justify the
New Drug rules, as their interest is qualitatively similar but quantitatively
greater than those for whom Amber Grail claims to speak.
Invocation of any putative right other than self-defense would lead to the
same outcome. Everyone who has, or who will have, heart cancer has the
same interest and the same right. Future victims require government
protection because they do not know who they are. If both sides seek the
same good, and have the same right, the conflict must be resolved by
balancing equities of the two sides. Furthermore, the remedy need not be
narrowly focused, but need only meet the tests prescribed by enhanced
public health scrutiny.
Indeed, based on the same principle, a government body that possesses
police power' 62 also can compel Bach to make bristlecone pine extract
available to the Woodsman family. In requiring Bach to make this drug
available, the state is pursuing a compelling interest in protecting the life
and health of the inchoate class of people that will develop heart cancer.
Again, a medical self-defense argument can, but need not, be used to
undergird a putative right to access the drug. And, again, the remedy need
not be narrowly tailored.
Since the substantive interests of the opposing parties are the same, the
only remaining considerations are the magnitude of the effect of alternative
policies and the adequacy of the procedures used to determine these effects
and to formulate rules. Determining the magnitude of the effect of
alternative public health policies is a strictly empirical project that is likely
to be highly technical and fact specific. Nevertheless, we have converted
the need for subjective choices between two incommensurate doctrines into
a factual question capable of objective and fair resolution.

162. Or the federal government, to the extent that it can act under the aegis of the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl.3, the Spending Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8,
cl.1, or the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONsT, art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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Of course, most clashes of rights and interests do not involve identical
health goals on both sides of the dispute. Indeed, public health laws can
interfere with rights not related to health in order to advance health goals.
For example, being subject to quarantine involves loss of liberty, and
possibly of livelihood, but not loss of health. Nevertheless, opposition of a
fundamental non-health right and a fundamental health interest invites
courts to weigh the magnitude of the empirical effects of alternative
solutions on both sides in the dispute. If competing interests are both
fundamental, they cannot be prioritized using this doctrine. If one side
loses something fundamental, then whatever the other side gains cannot, by
definition,163 be more than fundamental. One fundamental principle cannot
be more elemental than another. What is left to distinguish between the
parties' claims is the relative empirical benefit of their claims.
This solves the problem posed by B. Jessie Hill, a law professor at Case
Western Reserve. She argues that cases such as Jacobson that rely on
1 64
(that
public health considerations, and cases such as Stenberg v. Carhart
rely on fundamental rights), use incommensurate arguments, speak past one
another, and cannot be reconciled. 16 5 She appreciates that cases such as
Jacobson often contain externalities that affect other individuals' health,
while cases such as Stenberg do not.' 66 Nevertheless, she believes that the
incommensurateness of the demands of government power and the demands
of individual rights cannot be reconciled by a means other than judicial
balancing of doctrine.167 This is incorrect; the concepts of enhanced public
health scrutiny and inchoate classes allow courts to balance not doctrines,
but equities. Such empirical decision-making may be better accomplished
by agencies with expertise and by legislatures than by courts.' 68
163. Merriam-Webster defines "fundamental" as serving as an origin, primary; basic,
essential; of central importance." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 201 (11 th. ed. 2005).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "fundamental law" as "the organic law that establishes the
governing principles of a nation or state; esp. constitutional law." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
697 (8th ed. 2004). Both of these definitions seem to imply that fundamental laws cannot be
ranked according to importance.
164. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
165. Hill, supranote 17, at 279-83.
166. Id. at 326-28. Such externalities are avoided in termination of pregnancy cases by
the expedient of defining a fetus as not being a person. See Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158.
167. Hill, supranote 17, at 327-28.
168. However, agencies may be influenced by political considerations. This is said to be
true, for example, when agencies are asked to determine the efficacy of controversial
treatments such as abortion, medical abortifacients and post-coital contraceptives. See, e.g.,
Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865,
877-78 (2007). There is no burdened inchoate class in this circumstance, the Supreme Court
having decided that fetuses are not people with fundamental constitutional rights. See Roe,
410 U.S. at 158. However, if administrative actions single out reproductive procedures,
courts can address these on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause and of Roe privacy

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

27

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

140

[Vol. 20

The next section will demonstrate that the application of enhanced public
health scrutiny to laws that advance health-related interests of inchoate
classes would lead to the same outcomes that the Supreme Court has
achieved without explicit recourse to these doctrines. It will accomplish
this by applying these doctrines retrospectively to some decided cases.
Additionally, application of the doctrines to an undecided issue currently in
litigation will show the doctrines' applicability to such laws. This will thus
demonstrate that it is possible to elucidate a clear and consistent doctrine,
compatible with the Court's prior decisions, that allows government to
address threats to the health and safety of the public while preserving
fundamental rights.
V. A COHERENT DOCTRINE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE
The conclusions derived from the previous two sections can be
operationalized in the form of a four-step test to determine whether a public
health law will survive a substantive due process challenge (see Figure 1).
The threshold question is whether a law is a public health law-meaning
whether its purpose is to prevent or ameliorate disease or injury. The
second step of the analysis is to determine whether the law's challenger has
an interest emanating from a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution that is burdened by the public health law. If so, the third step
is to identify an inchoate class. An inchoate class is present when there are
as-yet-unidentified individuals whose health will be impaired if a law is not
implemented, but who will avoid the harm if the law is enforced. Finally,
enhanced public health scrutiny is applied to determine whether the
government may impose the regulation. This scrutiny requires that: (1) the
law's purpose must be to ameliorate a well-founded threat to public health;
(2) there is persuasive empirical evidence that the law will achieve this
purpose; (3) the public health benefits of the law exceed the overall burden;
and (4) the law exempts individuals who would incur disproportionate
adverse impact from its application.
This analysis would uphold the Louisiana quarantine law that the
69
Supreme Court upheld in Compagnie Francaise.1
This case considered
contending claims between police power and due process.1 70 The Court
rights and need not consider balancing with affirmative rights of persons other than the
pregnant woman. Id. at 152-53.
169. See Compagnie Francaise v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902).
170. See id at 387. Of interest is that an earlier quarantine case, Morgan's Steamship
Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 462 (1886), anticipates the concept of inchoate
classes, though it sees them at burdened classes rather than as protected classes. "The
danger comes from you [arriving ships], and though it may turn out that in your case there is
no danger, yet, as you belong to a class from which all this kind of injury comes, you must
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held that this statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.' 7'
Applying the four-step analysis shows that the law in question was a public
health law, and that it was effective. The beneficiary inchoate class
consisted of those who would be exposed to serious infectious diseases
without quarantine laws, but whom quarantine laws would save from
disease.17 2 The restriction was proportionate, and there was no individual
who was disproportionately burdened. The positive impact of averting
epidemics in the pre-antibiotic era was greater than the dual burden of ship
owners' submission to inspection and passengers' detention when serious
infectious disease was present on board.
In Jacobson, the balance was between the compulsory vaccination of
healthy people versus the effect of smallpox on members of an inchoate
class absent the vaccination program. Smallpox vaccination usually is
merely annoying, but can sometimes carry unusual and serious
complications. 73
The Jacobson Court permitted the compulsory
vaccination.174 In Zucht v. King, another smallpox vaccination case,. the
Court came to a similar conclusion.17 5
Similarly, the Court ruled in Breithaupt v. Abram that involuntary blood
alcohol tests given to drivers did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.'7 6
The Breithaupt Court balanced the violation of individual rights by forced
venipuncture against prevention of highway mayhem. There was an
inchoate class of future victims of accidents to which intoxication
contributed, but which were preventable by blood alcohol tests.'77
In Addington v. Texas, the Court rejected a claim that procedural due
process required states to prove psychotic patients' danger to self or others
beyond reasonable doubt to obtain civil commitment.' 78 The Court rejected
this argument, allowing the state to use the more lenient clear and
pay for the examination which distinguishes you from others of that class." Id.
171. See CompagnieFrancaise, 186 U.S. at 393.
172. See Morgan's Steamship Co., 118 U.S. at 459-60, upon which Compagnie
Francaiserelies. See Compagnie Francaise,186 U.S. at 391-92.
173. See generally John D. Grabenstein & William Winkenwerder, US Military
Smallpox Vaccination ProgramExperience, 289 JAMA 3278, 3280 (2003); Janie Parrino &
Barney S Graham, Smallpox Vaccines: Past, Present, and Future, 118 J. ALLERGY &
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 1320, 1323 (2006).
174. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-39 (1905).
175. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922).
176. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 452, 439-40 (1957).
177. Id. at 449 (Warren, J., Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting) ("As against the right
of an individual that his person be held inviolable, even against so slight an intrusion as is
involved in applying a blood test of the kind to which millions of Americans submit as a
matter of course nearly every day, must be set the interests of society in the scientific
determination of intoxication, one of the great causes of the mortal hazards of the road.").
178. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
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convincing standard.17 9 Its decision acknowledged the State's power to
treat such patients without their consent under the parens patriae
doctrine,'so and to protect others against them under the police power
There were two inchoate classes. The first was mentally ill
doctrine.''
people who would avert danger to themselves only if committed and
treated. The second consisted of other people who would be injured by the
mentally ill only if the latter were not committed.
If quarantine and civil commitment are permissible then, a fortiori,
forced administration of medicine, which is less of a burden, also should be
permissible. Indeed, the Court ruled in Washington v. Harper that forced
medication was permissible, at least in a prison setting.18 2 The Court
rejected a psychotic prisoner's claim that procedural due process entitled
him to a court hearing prior to being forcibly medicated. The Court held,
though, that psychiatric determination by prison staff was sufficient, being
"[it] is an accommodation between an inmate's liberty interest in avoiding
the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State's interests in
providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate
suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others."l83
As in Addington, there are two inchoate classes: those who would be
harmed by untreated mentally ill prisoners, and the ill prisoners who would
improve with treatment. Additionally, statutes exist which authorize civil
detention to enforce medical treatment regimens in certain circumstances.184
For example, courts have upheld statutes requiring confinement for the
purpose of compulsory treatment of tuberculosis.' 85
As already noted, the Rutherford Court upheld FDA denial of approval to
market Laetrile for treatment of cancer.' 8 6 The proportionality of equity is
one-sided in favor of banning Laetrile, which is both ineffective and
unsafe.18 7 The burdened liberty interests are the right of the purveyor to

179. See id at 433.
180. Id. at 426.
181. Id.
182. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990).
183. Id.
184. See Cal. Health & Safety Code, §§ 121358-65 (2006), for an example of a statute
authorizing involuntary detention of patients with tuberculosis under some circumstances.
185. See, e.g., In re Mary Doe, 205 A.D.2d 469, 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994);
Souvannarath v. Hadden, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Levin v. Adalberto
M., 67 Cal. Rptr .3d 277, 302-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); In re Washington, 735 N.W.2d 111,
131 (Wis. 2007). See, also, Calif. Health & Safety Code, §§ 121358 - 121365, an example
of a statute authorizing involuntary detention of patients with tuberculosis under some
circumstances.
186. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-54 (1979).
187. See Moertel, supra note 28, at 204.
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market an ineffective and unsafe preparation to desperate patients, and the
right of these patients to use this material. The patients who would suffer
from being duped into using Laetrile as an alternative to effective treatment
comprise the inchoate class.
In Cruzan, the Court weighed the plaintiffs liberty interest in refusing
medical care against the interest of a possible inchoate class of incompetent
individuals whose death will be engineered against their prior wishes by
their healthcare surrogates.' 88 There was no inchoate class with health
interests in the Cruzan dispute. It is difficult to ascribe any fundamental
interest to someone who never will have cognitive or perceptual abilities. If
there is an inchoate class with tangible interests, it consists of those who are
now competent but who later will not be able to make medical decisions.
Their interest is in having their decision honored is not a health interest
even though it involves medical care. This is because the patient's health
will not improve from being allowed to die, and the interest proposed by the
plaintiff is the timing of death. The State emphasized the risk of error and
asserted that it was protecting patients without capacity from preventable
death against their wishes. The State, in essence, was proposing an
inchoate class of individuals who would die against their wishes. Assuming
that some of these might recover cognition, the State was alleging that it
was protecting a fundamental interest in life held by members of an
inchoate class. With no plaintiff health interest, but an unrefuted claim of
health interest by the defendant State, the four-step test predicts that courts
will grant deference to states wishing to protect that interest in life. And
that is exactly what the Court did.
In Gonzales v. Raich, the petitioners sought a preliminary injunction
against the Drug Enforcement Administration from enforcing laws that
prohibited their intrastate, non-commercial cultivation of marijuana.189 The
Court ruled, however, that the Commerce Clause gave the federal
government authority over this practice.190 The law clearly deals with
public health. Proportionality is hard to determine, though, as the factual
basis of this case rested on overblown claims propounded by both sides.
Plaintiffs' claims that marijuana was "the only the only drug available that
provides effective treatment,"1 91 and that "discontinuation of marijuana
188. See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("[A] competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.").
189. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S..1, 7 (2005) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 810).
190. Id. at 26-33. "Because the [Controlled Substances Act] is a statute that directly
regulates economic commercial activity, our opinion in [United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000)] casts no doubt on its constitutionality." Id. at 26.
191. Id. at 7.
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could very well prove fatal,"l 9 2 are inconsistent with what is known about
the drug.' 93 On the other hand, the congressional finding that marijuana
was a hallucinogenic substance meriting classification under the CSA as a
Class I substance is belied by widespread recreational experience with the

drug.

194

Class I substances

are characterized as having "no currently accepted

medical use in treatment in the United States," and as having "lack of
accepted safety... under medical supervision." 95 They may not be
prescribed by physicians.196 In short, there was little scientific reason to
believe that an inchoate class existed whose members' health would have
benefitted from a court decision in either direction.
Finally, the sequence of pregnancy termination cases beginning with
Roe, and extending through Casey and beyond, could have been adjudicated
as a conflict between maternal interests such as reproductive privacy and
protection of health, and the interest of fetuses in their own life. The Court
could have found an inchoate class consisting of fetuses that would have
survived but for termination of pregnancy and tried to balance equities.
Instead, the Court held in Roe that a fetus does not have legal standing as a
person,1 97 thereby finessing the issue.' 9 8 Subsequent to Casey, the Court
decided that Congress had the power to define the end of the fetal state by
allowing Congress to define birth. The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart9 9
upheld Federal 200 criminal penalties 20 1 for a procedure called "dilatation and
extraction," where part of the fetus is delivered beyond the maternal cervix
prior to killing the fetus.202 Once fetal parts sufficiently exited the cervix, a
conceptus was held to be close enough to having personal status to enjoy

192. See id.at 6.
193. See Stanley J. Watson et al., Marijuanaand Medicine: Assessing the Science Base:
A Summary of the 1999 Institute of Medicine Report, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 547,
552 (2000) ("[T]he data indicate a modest potential therapeutic value for cannabinoid drugs,
particularly for indications, such as pain relief.").
194. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2006).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B)-(C) (2006).
196. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) (stating it is a crime "to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense" a Class I
substance.).
197. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (noting that "[T]he word "person," as used in the
FourteenthAmendment, does not include the unborn").
198. See id. at 164-65; see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992) (The Court has tacitly declined to embrace wholeheartedly its exclusion of
fetuses from personhood. This is reflected in its reserving a state interest in fetal well-being
after viability).
199. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
200. See id. at 141-43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 131 (2000 Supp. IV)).
201. See id. at 132-33.
202. See id. at 136- 40.
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greater protection than a fetus in utero.203 This nascent child presumably
has sufficient personal status to belong to an inchoate class.
The pregnancy termination cases neither have an affect on, nor are
affected by, the four-step test. If the Roe line of cases were reversed,
fetuses would be brought under the public health umbrella by factors
outside the ambit of public health law scrutiny. Fetuses might be brought
under the protection of these laws if states could assign them personal
status, which is not a public health measure. The four-step test can
determine how courts should resolve conflicts among legally acknowledged
persons in which public health is an issue, but it is neutral as to the
definition of personal identity.
Finally, I will analyze Flynn v. Holder, a pending case brought by
would-be bone marrow transplant recipients and an organization
representing their cause.204 The plaintiffs seek to overturn the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),205 to the extent of allowing private parties
to pay bone marrow donors. They claim violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 206 asserting that NOTA arbitrarily classifies bone marrow as an
organ 2 07 for purposes of prohibiting valuable consideration, rather than as
"renewable or inexhaustible loose-cell types" such as blood or sperm
donations.208 The complaint also alleges a substantive due process violation
based on a right to pursue lifesaving medical treatment. 20 9 This article
assumes, arguendo, the validity of the plaintiffs constitutional claims.
Opponents of compensation for bone marrow donations argue that: (1) it
is unpalatable to compensate for tissue donation; (2) the need to compensate
donors will increase costs of transplantation; (3) poor people therefore will
be excluded from having marrow transplantation; and (4) paying donors
may jeopardize recipient safety because paid donors may not admit to
germane medical conditions.2 10
Economics professors Gar S. Becker and Julio Jorge Elias have estimated
that allowing a market in donation of kidneys and liver tissue would greatly
203. See id. at 158; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732-35 (1997).
204. See INST. FOR JUSTICE, Flynn v. Holder: Challenge to the National Organ
Transplant Act, http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=2900&I
temid= 165, (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006).
206. Compl. for Final J., Flynn v. Holder, No. 09-07772 (C.D.C.A., October 26, 2009),
at 48-49 [hereinafter Flynn Complaint].
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2006).
208. Flynn Complaint, supra note 206, at 48-49.
209. See id. at 49-50.
210. See Kevin B. O'Reilly, Ban on Paying Bone Marrow Donors Challengedin Court,
AMEDNEWS.COM, (Dec., 21, 2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/12/21/prsa
1221.htm.
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increase the number of organs available for transplantation, while raising
the cost of a procedure by no more than twelve percent. 2 11 Ted C.
Bergstrom, also a professor Economics, modeled bone marrow
transplantation and predicted that compensation of donors would markedly
*
212
increase
availability.
We can analyze this case using the four-step test. First, NOTA is public
health legislation, as it regulates treatment of disease. Next, a fundamental
interest in seeking effective medical treatment for fatal illnesses such as
leukemia by increasing the number of donors is pitted against possible
endangerment of donors (not a major factor with bone marrow donation),
endangerment of recipients, claims of commodification of donors, and
exclusion of people without means from the bone marrow recipient pool.
Assuming that each side is defending fundamental interests, we now look at
the probable impact on identifiable and inchoate parties both in the status
quo and in the situation that would obtain if plaintiffs injunction were
granted.
There is an inchoate class that would benefit from a market in bone
marrow donation. This class consists of those individuals with blood
diseases who would obtain bone marrow donation only if donors could be
compensated. This is weighed against the impact of the injury to donors
and recipients of these extra donations, and perhaps against opportunity
costs of using scarce resources to pay for the added bone marrow donations.
It is possible to reasonably estimate the number of people who will feel
coerced by having donated marrow for money, and to assign a qualitative or
quantitative value to this. The four-step test predicts that the plaintiff will
have a strong case, as saving lives is weighed against the burden on paid
donors of possible coercion, discomfort, a small risk of danger, and possible
loss of dignity. The NOTA provision fails the proportionality test of
enhanced public health scrutiny, and whatever inchoate class would benefit
from NOTA enforcement will derive less overall benefit than paid marrow
transplantation would bring to the additional recipients.
As this analysis of Flynn v. Holder demonstrates, this model can be used
to analyze any dispute in which there is a challenge to public health laws
based on constitutionally guaranteed liberties.

211. See Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in the Market for
Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations,21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2007).
212. Ted C. Bergstrom et al., One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow
Registry (UC Santa Barbara: Dep't of Econ. Working Paper) available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2xtlp3gf (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
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CONCLUSION

This article has addressed, and resolved, the tension between substantive
due process doctrine and the use of state power to safeguard public health
against serious or systemic threats. It proposes doctrines that do not deny
any existing or proposed constitutional rights, and that specifically do not
require diminution of currently recognized reproductive rights. Rather,
these doctrines elevate the health interests of members of the community to
the same level of priority as the interest of those whose rights are burdened
by laws that protect those health interests.
First, the proposed doctrine requires that a public health law comply with
four elements (characterized as "enhanced public health scrutiny): (1) the
law's purpose must be amelioration of a well-founded threat to public
health; (2) there must be persuasive empirical evidence that the law will
achieve this purpose; (3) the public health benefits must exceed the overall
burden of the law; and (4) the law must exempt individuals who would
incur disproportionate adverse impact if they were subjected to the law.
Second, the doctrine recognizes that the beneficiaries of public health
laws comprise an inchoate class of individuals who: (1) will incur a specific
disease or injury absent the proposed law; (2) cannot be identified before
they incur this disease or injury; and (3) will not experience the disease or
injury if the law is enforced. Prevention or amelioration of the threat to
their health is a compelling government interest. Government protection of
this interest can withstand challenges based on abrogation of fundamental
rights of people outside the inchoate. The government, on behalf of the
inchoate class, must only prove that the magnitude of protection offered by
the public health law is greater than the magnitude of the harm caused by
the law. This is an empirical inquiry.
Taken together, these two doctrines suggest a four-part test to determine
whether a public health law should survive a rights-based challenge. The
four steps are: (1) determine whether the law's purpose is to improve public
health; (2) determine whether the law burdens a fundamental right of a
party opposing the law; (3) determine whether there is an inchoate class;
and (4) determine whether the law survives enhanced public health scrutiny
as defined above.
Applying this doctrine to cases that have been decided accurately mirrors
the outcome of prior cases. Adoption of this doctrine would provide a clear
and stable basis for addressing rights-based challenges to public health
legislation without radically altering the law as it now stands.
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Figure 1. The four-step test for assessing the constitutionality of a
public health law faced with a challenge based on fundamental rights.
1. Is the law in question a public health law?

NO

YES

2. Does the challenger have an interest burdened
by the law, but protected by Due Process?

1

NO

YES

3. Is there an inchoate class with important health
interests protected by the law?

YES

I

NO

4. Does the law survive enhanced healthcare scrutiny?
a. Is the law's purpose to ameliorate a well-founded
threat to public health?
b. Is there persuasive empirical evidence that the law
will achieve this?
c. Do the public health benefits of the law exceed the
overall burden?
d. Does the law exempt individuals who would incur
disproportionate impact from its application?

YES

4

The law survives a constitutional

challenge
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NO

The law may not survive
a constitutional challenge
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Table 1: Summary of cases and analysis using paradigm of enhanced
public health scrutiny and inchoate classes
CASE
Compagnie
Francaise
(1902)
Jacobson
(1905)
Zucht
(1922)

NOTE
#
16

7
7

Breithaupt
(1957)

122

Addington
(1979)

168

Harper
(1990)

8

Rutherford
(1979)

9

Cruzan
(1990)

83

Raich
(2005)

9

Roe (1973)
and other
termination
of
pregnancy
cases

17
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DUE
PROCESS
BURDEN
Quarantine;
detention and
exclusion
Compelled
vaccination
Same;
exclusion from
school
Involuntary
venipuncture
for forensic
purpose

PUTATIVE
HEALTH
BURDEN
Grave
infectious
disease
Contracting
smallpox
Contracting
smallpox

BALANCE
OF EQUITY

Highway
injury and
mortality

State

Involuntary
commitment
by clear and
convincing
evidence
Forced
injection; no
requirement
for judicial
hearing if
prisoner
Right to sell
and use
ineffective and
dangerous
drug for
cancer
Autonomy in
choosing to
receive
medical care

Untreated
mental
illness;
violence to
others
Untreated
mental
illness;
violence to
others

State

Putative pain
relief and life
preservation
from
marijuana
Reproductive
autonomy and
protection of
maternal
health

State

State
State

SOURCE OF
INCHOATE
CLASS
Port residents
who would
contract illness
Community
residents
Classmates

DECISION
For state

For state
For state

Drivers,
passengers and
pedestrians
exposed to
intoxicated
drivers
Psychotic
patients and
their contacts

For state

Psychotic
prisoners and
their contacts

For state

Protection of State
public from
quack remedy

Patients who
would use
Laetrile instead
of effective
treatment

For state

Protecting
incompetent
persons from
unwanted
death

State

For state

Protection of
the public
from
marijuana

Indeterminate

Persons whom
health care
surrogates
would allow to
die against
their will
Unclear if any

Fetal life

Depends
upon fetal
status

None; fetuses
have no
personal status

Against
state

State

For state

For state
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